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Will There Be Blood? 
Incentives and Substitution Effects in Pro-social Behavior
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We examine how economic incentives affect pro-social behavior through the analysis of a 
unique dataset with information on more than 14,000 American Red Cross blood drives. Our 
findings are consistent with blood donors responding to incentives in a “standard” way; 
offering donors economic incentives significantly increases turnout and blood units collected, 
and more so the greater the incentive’s monetary value. In addition, there is no 
disproportionate increase in donors who come to a drive but are ineligible to donate when 
incentives are offered. Further evidence from a small-scale field experiment corroborates 
these findings and confirms that donors are motivated by the economic value of the items 
offered. We also find that a substantial fraction of the increase in donations due to incentives 
may be explained by donors substituting away from neighboring drives toward drives where 
rewards are offered, and the likelihood of this substitution is higher the higher the monetary 
value of the incentive offered and if neighboring drives do not offer incentives. Thus, extrinsic 
incentives motivate pro-social behavior, but unless substitution effects are also considered, 
the effect of incentives may be overestimated. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding and motivating individual behavior involving pro-social activities is of great interest to 
researchers and policymakers. These activities represent a substantial part of social life and include 
actions from donating money and time across many different causes and organizations. In the US alone, 
the value of volunteer time is over $240 billion annually (Independent Sector 2006). Yet supply is still 
below societal needs for many of these activities. Because the supply of pro-social activities often falls 
short of societal demands, and since most of these activities are provided voluntarily, a potential solution 
would be to offer economic incentives as a further motivator. Standard economic theory generally 
predicts that adding an economic incentive to perform an activity will increase the supply of that activity. 
A number of contributions in psychology and economics, however, argue that when people are 
“intrinsically” motivated to perform the task, adding an extrinsic incentive could reduce supply of the 
activity because the extrinsic incentive might undermine the intrinsic motivation and also attract the 
“wrong” types of agents to perform the activity (Deci 1975, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Benabou and 
Tirole 2006). Surveys and laboratory experiments lend support to this non-standard response to economic 
incentives for the provision of pro-social behavior (Deci 1975, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Gneezy 
and Rustichini 2000). 
The academic community’s interest in understanding motivations for pro-social behavior and the 
policy relevance associated with the voluntary supply of blood makes blood donations an ideal 
environment to assess the effects of offering material incentives. In this paper, we find that blood donors 
respond to the presence of extrinsic incentives in a standard way; donations increase when incentives are 
offered, the increase is greater for incentives of higher economic value, and donors substitute toward 
blood drives with incentives and away from drives without incentives, and more so the greater the value 
of incentive offered. Furthermore, the presence of incentives does not disproportionately attract 
individuals to a drive who are not eligible to donate.  
Situations of blood supply shortage are the rule rather than the exception in most western countries, 
and even more so in developing nations. This chronic shortage is worrisome since blood transfusions can 
be life-saving in situations following a trauma, during surgical interventions, and to treat several chronic 
diseases, and there remains no substitute for human blood. In addition, surgical innovations such as organ 
transplants and demographic changes such as population aging are significantly increasing demand.
1 
Neither eligibility criteria nor a lack of information are likely to explain the supply shortage since, for 
example, only about 8% of the 115 million Americans who are eligible to donate blood actually donate 
                                                            
1 The Web site BloodBook.com reports that more than 16 million units of blood are collected annually in the United States. In the 
US, the American Red Cross and other organizations collecting blood target to have, at each point in time, the blood necessary 
for three days of demand at each location and for each blood type, but this target is seldom met, especially for rare blood types 
(including 0 negative, which is the universal donor and therefore particularly precious). Moreover, it is estimated that worldwide, 
there is currently a shortage of about 22 million units of blood per year (HemoBiotech 2008). This shortage may grow worse over 
time as demand for blood increases. For instance, on average a liver transplant requires 40 units of blood and about half of the 
blood supply is used for those age 65 and older (www.bloodbook.com). 3 
 
each year despite information campaigns and frequent communication about shortages (American Red 
Cross 2009, Riley, Schwei, and McCullough 2007). Thus, even among eligible and informed individuals 
it appears that the benefits (utility) of donating blood fall short of the costs. 
Offering material rewards to motivate blood donations has a long history of opposition, however. 
Titmuss (1971), in particular, hypothesized that monetary payments would have a negative effect on both 
the quantity and quality of blood donations, a claim that more recent theories mentioned above have 
formalized. Since the early 1970s many countries have implemented policies prohibiting payment for 
blood donations, and the World Health Organization set a goal in 1997 for all blood donations to come 
from unpaid volunteer donors (WHO 2006).  
The limited empirical evidence on the effects of offering incentives on blood donations has been 
mixed. Partially consistent with recent theories, Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) found that female 
college students, when involved in a study on attitudes toward blood donations, were less willing to 
undertake a health test to check for their eligibility as blood donors if they were offered a monetary 
incentive (however, they found no effect among men).
2 In contrast and partially inconsistent with these 
theories, Goette and Stutzer (2008) found that offering lottery tickets to donors increased turnout at blood 
drives among infrequent donors, but they also found no effect among frequent donors nor any effect 
when donors were offered a free cholesterol test. Furthermore, Lacetera and Macis (2008a) show that the 
legislative provision that guarantees a paid day off work to Italian blood donors led to a substantial 
increase in donation frequency. Thus, the results from the studies that have examined the effects of 
offering economic incentives have been mixed, possibly due to differences in the incentives offered, 
differences in the demographics and the populations studied, or a variety of other factors that varied 
across these studies. 
In addition to the results being inconclusive, there are several unanswered questions from the existing 
research on the effect of incentives on blood donations in particular, and on the supply of pro-social 
activities in general. First, most laboratory experiments use college students as subjects who are typically 
ages 18 to 25. However, individuals under the age of 25 represent only a small portion of the population 
of blood donors; so results may not reflect how older people would respond to incentives. Second, most 
studies examine the effects of just one or two specific incentives on a pro-social behavior, and thus the 
results could be idiosyncratic to features of the incentive used. Third, surveys and experiments meant to 
assess the determinants of pro-social behavior might suffer from scrutiny and social desirability biases if 
the subjects are aware of being observed as part of a study (Lazear, Malmendier and Weber 2006, Levitt 
and List 2007). 
                                                            
2 Several studies have focused on other types of extrinsic motives, namely the quest for social recognition through the 
performance of altruistic activities. Theoretical models, anecdotal evidence, and laboratory experiments suggest that, in fact, 
individuals' altruistic behavior is also driven by social-image concerns. See, for example, Harbaugh (1998a, 1998b), Wedekind 
(1998), Nowak and Sigmund (2000), Price (2003), Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2007), Polborn (2007), and Lacetera and Macis 
(2008b). On the whole debate on the determinants of pro-social behavior, see the comprehensive survey by Meier (2006). 4 
 
A fourth feature of existing studies is that they examine the effect of incentives on altruistic behavior 
typically at a single location and period where the activity can be performed. This approach does not 
consider the complete set of choices individuals face when incentives are offered. Individuals might 
substitute among several voluntary pro-social activities, and thus offering incentives at one location and 
time, whatever its immediate effect may be, may have consequences at other locations. For instance, 
incentives may increase blood donations when offered at one location, but could perhaps reduce 
donations at other locations or in the future. The opposite is also possible; incentives may crowd out 
blood donations at one location, but increase donations at other locations (presumably where incentives 
are not offered). Testing for the presence of these substitution effects will give a more comprehensive 
assessment of responses to incentives, and also has major policy implications for the design and 
coordination of initiatives meant to increase pro-social behavior in a population. 
Substitution from lower to higher utility activities is a standard behavioral response, but the evidence 
on how it plays out in the context of pro-social behavior is scant. Gross (2005) suggests that the patterns 
of donations in the aftermath of the 2005 Asian Tsunami reflect substantial substitution effects with 
donors redirecting monetary donations away from other charities. Cairns and Slonim (2008) document 
that when a second collection is present at Catholic Mass, the amount collected for the first collection 
(which typically has a different destination) decreases significantly. On the other hand, Shang and Croson 
(2009) find that social comparisons that increase charitable contributions to public radio do not adversely 
affect future contributions. These studies, however, highlight the difficulty of examining substitution 
effects involving monetary contributions; it remains quite possible that donors are still substituting their 
charitable monetary donations away from other charitable causes and organizations not observed in these 
studies. Thus, with monetary donations there could be potentially many substitutes. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of the provision of economic incentives on voluntary blood 
supply, using detailed data on all the American Red Cross (ARC) blood drives occurring in northern Ohio 
between May 2006 and October 2008. Crucial for the analysis, the data include information on whether 
an incentive was offered at each blood drive, the type of item offered (e.g., blankets, T-shirts, mugs, 
coupons, etc.), and the ARC cost to purchase the item. Our unit of observation is a blood drive, and our 
data include 14,029 observations. With an average of 37 donors per drive, the data reflect the behavior 
of more than 500,000 donor-drive pairs. The sample size and composition makes this study of incentives 
for blood donation (and more generally for pro-social activities) the largest and most representative to 
date. 
The data for each drive also include the number of people who present to donate, the number of 
blood units collected, the number of people deferred from donating, as well as the drive’s sponsor, date, 
and address. Many drives are run at the same location repeatedly over time and are typically run by the 
same sponsor. Moreover, most drives run at a same location by a specific sponsor sometimes offer 
incentives while other times do not offer incentives. Further, institutional details indicate that within 5 
 
drives at a given location by a given sponsor the presence or absence of a promotion is to a large extent 
non-systematic. The data, therefore, allow us to perform fixed-effect regressions to identify the impact of 
the presence of incentives on the turnout and units collected at a drive, as well as on the percentage of 
donors who are deferred because they are ineligible to donate; the percentage of donors who are deferred 
provides a measure of the type of individuals who are attracted to a drive. Finally, we exploit the 
information on the location and date of each drive to analyze the impact that incentives have not only at 
the drive where they are offered, but also on the temporally and spatially neighboring drives to assess 
substitution and aggregate effects of incentive on donations. In contrast to monetary donations which 
have many possible substitutes, there are few close substitutes to donating blood at a given drive other 
than donating blood at a different time or location.
3 This relative lack of substitutes makes an 
examination of substitution effects for blood donations particularly insightful for whether pro-social 
activities are positively or negatively affected by the presence of material incentives. 
Our estimates show that the number of donors who attempt to donate and the number of units of 
blood collected significantly increase when incentives are offered. On average, offering incentives leads 
to between 5 and 6.7 extra donors presenting at a drive – an increase of about 13 to 18 percent. Using the 
cost of each different item to the ARC as a proxy for the value of these promotions to the donors, we find 
a positive and significant relationship between the cost of the incentives and turnout and units collected. 
We also find that the effect of incentives on donations is significantly larger when more donors are made 
aware that an incentive is offered and when more donors are permitted to donate at a drive. We further 
find that offering incentives did not increase the percent of donors being deferred, suggesting that the 
composition of the donor pool does not change when incentives are offered. These results indicate that 
economic incentives do not crowd out the quantity of pro-social behavior in the context of blood 
donations – in fact, quite the opposite. 
These conclusions from the analysis of the large sample of historical drives are replicated in a small-
scale field experiment run at randomly selected Red Cross blood drives. In the experiment, a set of 
similar drives were selected and then randomly divided into control conditions where no incentives were 
offered and treatment conditions where $5 and $20 gift cards for local merchants were offered. 
Comparing outcomes between control and treatment drives, and controlling for past outcomes at the same 
drives (a difference-in-difference analysis) shows that turnout and units collected are higher in the 
treatment conditions and higher the greater the value of the gift cards, with no impact on the percent of 
deferred donors. 
                                                            
3 Besides neighboring ARC blood drives that are close substitutes, other potential substitutes, though less close than donating 
whole blood to the ARC, include plasma donations and donations at a few existing private blood banks. However, both of these 
potential substitutes are a small portion of the blood donation market; for instance, plasma donations are a tiny fraction of the 
blood donation market. In addition, plasma donations take substantially longer and typically attract distinct donors. To the extent 
that there are additional substitutes not captured by other ARC northern Ohio drives, our estimates will underestimate substitution 
effects and consequently overestimate the total effect of incentives on donations.  6 
 
Donors not only respond to the presence of incentives in a standard way by increasing supply at a 
given site, but also substitute supply across locations in response to incentives; our analysis indicates that 
donors substitute their blood donation activity toward neighboring drives that offer incentives. Moreover, 
donors are more likely to substitute away from drives that do not offer incentives than from drives that 
offer incentives. In addition, we find that the substitution effects are larger if incentives are offered at 
physically and temporally close neighboring drives (e.g., within 2 miles) and more so when the incentives 
offered at the close neighboring drives are of higher monetary value. Our results further show that these 
substitution effects may be substantial, depending on the value of the incentive given and on the number 
of neighboring drives. Thus, ignoring substitution effects can lead to a substantial overestimate of the 
total effect of incentives on pro-social behavior.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers institutional and organizational details on the 
ARC activities related to the collection of blood and describes the data used in this study. Section 3 
analyzes the “direct effects” of providing incentives for blood donation. Section 4 describes and reports 
the results from the small-scale field experiment. Section 5 examines substitution effects and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Context and Data 
Our strategy to identify the effects of incentives on blood donation takes advantage of several 
institutional features of the blood collection system run by the American Red Cross. Before introducing 
the data of this study, we describe some of these institutional details. 
 
2.1 The American Red Cross in Northern Ohio 
The ARC operates 36 regional blood centers within the U.S. and Puerto Rico. The data for this study 
covers all (14,029) blood drives organized by the Northern Ohio Blood Services Region from May 1, 
2006, to October 8, 2008. A blood drive consists of a sponsor who works with an ARC representative for 
collection of blood at a specific location on a specific date. 
The ARC defines individuals who have attempted to donate blood within the past two years as 
“active” and those who have not been disqualified as “eligible.” Donors can be disqualified for a variety 
of reasons that either endanger the donor or result in an unusable donation, including anemia, low blood 
pressure and low iron, and certain behaviors (e.g., travel) that increase the risks of potential blood 
problems that tests cannot detect. Donors are also ineligible to donate for 56 days after making a whole 
blood donation. 
The ARC follows several rules to determine who to inform of upcoming blood drives. First, the ARC 
restricts who they contact to only eligible donors. Second, donors are typically informed only about the 
drives occurring in the county where they live. In some counties ARC representatives send donors a 
postcard informing them of one specific drive occurring in the forthcoming calendar month, typically the 7 
 
drive taking place in the location where a donor has donated in the past. We call drives in these counties 
“postcard county drives.” In the other counties (the majority), representatives send instead a flyer 
informing donors of all drives in the county occurring in the next calendar month. We refer to drives 
occurring in these counties as “flyer county drives.” Flyers are mailed out on the 23
rd or 24
th of the 
month, and postcards are mailed on an ongoing basis as a drive approaches. Figure 1 provides an example 
of a flyer and postcard advertisement (names and contact information are blackened over for privacy 
considerations).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
A blood drive is either “open” or “closed.” In open drives, anyone can present to donate. Closed 
drives are not advertised on the monthly flyers, and only members of a given organization (e.g., students 
or employees) are informed about these drives. 
The ARC offers a variety of economic incentives at blood drives. Importantly, if a drive offers an 
item as an incentive, the item must be given to all presenting donors (i.e., those who turn out to donate) 
regardless of whether they donate, are eligible, or are deferred for any reason. The most common items 
include T-shirts, jackets, coolers, blankets, and coupons and gifts cards from various merchants. The 
ARC officer responsible for recruitment is given a budget each year to use to decide which items to 
purchase. These items are then allocated proportionally to district managers. Each district manager then 
decides how to allocate the different promotions across the drives in his or her district. There are three 
district managers in northern Ohio. 
ARC officials and managers informed us that the sponsor-drive combination is the relevant unit of 
observation for the assignment of incentives. Some sponsor-drive combinations systematically attract a 
greater number of donors, and some drives and locations may have donors who are more responsive to 
the presence of an incentive, for instance, because some items may appeal to different populations. 
Nonetheless, the ARC managers stressed that they make a conscious attempt to offer incentives evenly 
across most sponsor-drive locations over time, mostly because of budget constraints and fairness 
considerations toward all sponsors. The allocation of incentives across drives within a given drive-
sponsor combination, therefore, is to a large extent non-systematic. 
Sponsors have some flexibility in organizing drives. For instance, they can choose to make a drive 
open or closed, determine the location and number of hours of the drive, and whom to inform (in addition 
to the county contact rules and donors satisfying the ARC active and eligible requirements). This opens 
the possibility that economic incentives might affect how sponsors behave. For instance, sponsors might 
contact more donors when an incentive is given at a drive. Thus, higher turnout in response to economic 
incentives could be explained by either changes in donor supply or changes in sponsor behavior. From a 
public policy or Red Cross perspective, the total effect on donations is likely the most critical outcome. It 
is also critical to separate these alternative explanations to isolate the effect of incentives on donor 
supply. However, while economic incentives may be affecting sponsor behavior in addition to donor 8 
 
behavior, this alternative explanation seems unlikely. In fact, the flexibility of sponsors to change the 
features of a drive is limited in a number of ways, and, importantly, it is not related to the presence of 
incentives at a drive. First, the vast majority of sponsors organize either all open or all closed drives. 
Second, once the length of a drive is determined, which typically occurs in advance of determining 
whether an incentive will offered, the length cannot be changed because of the presence of an incentive. 
Third, the vast majority of donors are contacted through standardized and centralized procedures, with 
sponsors and representatives affecting the number and types of donors contacted only very marginally. In 
addition to the limited flexibility sponsors have, our econometric analyses along with corroborative 
results from our small-scale controlled field experiment provide further support that donors rather than 
sponsors are changing behavior. 
 
2.2 The Data 
We have information on the date, time, and location (street address, town, and zip code) of a drive, the 
number of donors presenting and deferred, the units of blood collected, and whether a drive is open or 
closed and in a flyer or postcard county. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on these variables. On 
average, 31.3 units of blood are collected from 37 donors presenting and drives last 5.4 hours. Turnout 
varies from more than 700 to fewer than 10 donors.
4 Seventy-eight percent of drives are open, and 80 
percent are advertised using county-level monthly flyers. For each blood drive, we also gathered weather 
data for the day and location of each drive. There is substantial variation in temperature, rain, and snow 
conditions in northern Ohio. Temperature, rain, rain intensity (average rain per hour), and snow on the 
ground can exert significant influence on the outcome of blood drives, and thus controlling for these 
factors improves the precision of the estimates. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The data also indicate whether a promotion was offered at each drive and, if so, what kind of 
promotion. About 37 percent of drives, overall, offer material incentives. ARC record data began to keep 
track of the presence of promotions on May 1, 2006, which explains the starting date for the data we 
analyze. 
Table 2 lists common promotion items that the ARC offers. The most common material incentive is 
represented by T-shirts, given out in nearly 50 percent of all drives that offer incentives. Coupons are the 
second most common material incentive and are given out in over eight percent of the drives offering 
incentives. Coolers, sweatshirts, and hats are the next most common promotional items. In some cases, 
sponsors propose or add incentives to those offered by the ARC. This occurs in about 25 percent of the 
drives with incentives. Unfortunately, information on the nature of the sponsor incentives is not available; 
                                                            
4 In a handful of drives, the number of donors presenting was zero due to extraordinary circumstances such as power 
interruptions. In our regression analysis we make sure the results are not driven by outliers by dropping from the sample the 
drives in the top and bottom one percent of the distribution of presenting donors. 9 
 
conversations with ARC managers indicated that these sponsor incentives tend to have small value (e.g., 
mugs or lottery tickets with expected values less than two dollars). Some drives are also characterized by 
special attributes; for example, a drive may be run in memory of or in honor of an individual, or it may be 
particularly (but not exclusively) targeted to 0-type donors. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3a shows summary statistics on sponsor types using the ARC’s codification.
5 The most 
common sponsor type, sponsoring 44 percent of all drives, was the general community, which includes 
drives at town halls and libraries. Manufacturing firms, hospitals, and high schools each sponsored more 
than seven percent of the drives. The percent of drives that offer incentives varied substantially across 
sponsor types. There is also substantial variation among the 2,664 different individual sponsors in terms 
of both the number of drives sponsored and in the use of incentives. While 846 sponsors organized 
exactly one drive between May 2006 and October 2008, 1,818 others organized two or more drives.  
[Table 3a about here] 
Table 3b shows that there is large variation also within sponsors who run more than one drive in their 
use of incentives. In particular, more than 40 percent of sponsors (constituting more than 77 percent of all 
the drives and nearly 11,000 drives) run multiple drives with variation in terms of having drives with and 
without incentives. This variation, together with the ability to control for a number of other factors, will 
be critical for our identification strategy. 
[Table 3b about here] 
The present study departs from past empirical work by estimating the effects of incentives, not only 
when and where they are offered, but also at potential “substitute drives” that donors may be attracted to 
(or away from) that are temporally and geographically close. We used GIS software to compute the 
driving distance between the street addresses of all blood drives in our sample.
6 To determine potential 
substitute drives for each of the drives in our data, we initially limited the travel distance between drives 
to be within ten miles. Next, we limited the set of potential substitute drives to those that are within 56 
days prior to a drive’s date, since donors are not eligible to donate again if they donated less than 56 days 
prior to a drive.
7 Finally, we limited potential substitute drives going forward in time to include only 
                                                            
5 We only report sponsor types in Table 3a with at least 100 drives to protect the privacy of individual sponsors who ran just a 
few drives and would be easily identifiable. However, all sponsors are included in the regression analyses.  
6 Driving distances were calculated using standard GIS network-path algorithms for finding the shortest path through a network, 
following from Dijkstra's (1959) shortest-path approach. The approach uses a shortest-path algorithm to find the shortest, least-
cost route through a network from one point to another. In the case of distance, each road segment in the network was weighted 
by its Euclidean distance across space as the measure of "cost" in the shortest-path algorithm. All locations within a specified 
maximum distance (10 miles) were identified. All calculations were performed in GIS using the ESRI Streetmap 9.3 GIS data for 
North America, which includes highly detailed US street and rail network data provided by Tele Atlas. When the GIS software 
could not find an exact geo-location, the address of the nearest US post office was used. There were 321 such cases.  
7 It is of course possible that drives occurring more than 56 days earlier could be a substitute. For instance, if donors donate once 
per year, and their next planned donation is 4 months away, but a drive advertises a promotion that attracts them to shift forward 
their next donation, but has no effect on their once a year donation behavior, then there would be no change in overall donations 
and only a substitution effect would have occurred. In analyses not shown, we did not detect temporal substitution over 56 days. 10 
 
drives that donors would have been made aware of by either the monthly flyers or postcards. For drives 
occurring prior to the 25
th of the month, we limit potential substitute drives going forward to only those 
that occur up to the end of that same month, since donors would not have been made aware of drives 
occurring in the following month; and for drives occurring after the 25
th of a given month, we extend 
potential substitute drives to those occurring up to the end of the following month since donors would 
have been made aware of drives occurring in the following month. 
Table 4 shows that, on average, 6.5 potential substitute drives occur within two miles of every drive, 
7.7 between two and four miles away, and nearly 37 additional potential substitute drives occur between 
four and ten miles away. Further, the average number of potential substitute drives that offer an incentive 
are 2.6, 3.1, and 14.6 that occur within two miles, between two and four miles, and between four and ten 
miles, respectively. The bottom panel in Table 4 shows that when we limit the number of potential 
substitute drives to open drives in flyer counties we obtain similar numbers of potential substitutes. 
[Table 4 about here] 
On the basis of these data, we now describe our empirical identification strategy and then our findings. 
We first focus on the “direct” or “local” effects of incentives, i.e., ignoring substitution, and then assess 
the impact of substitution effects. 
 
3. The “Direct” Effect of Incentives 
3.1 Empirical model and identification strategy 
We present estimates of the following model: 
 
, ijt ijt ijt i ijt y INCENTIVE X α βγ η ε =+ + ++            (1) 
where i, j, and t denote the drive, sponsor, and calendar date, respectively. We examine three outcomes 
yijt: the number of people presenting (turnout),
8 the units of blood collected, and the percentage of 
deferred people relative to those presenting. The variable INCENTIVEijt is an indicator for the presence of 
promotions at drive ijt. Therefore the parameter β represents, ceteris paribus, the marginal effect on the 
dependent variable (i.e., turnout, units collected, or percent deferred donors) between drives with no 
incentives and drives with incentives. 
The vector Xijt includes a drive’s length in hours, weather conditions on the day of the drive 
(temperature dummies, rain, rain intensity, and snow on the ground),9 and dummies for year, month, 
week-of-the-month, day-of-the week, ARC representative, and zip-codes, as well as the presence of 
                                                            
8 If a donor leaves at any time after registering, she will be classified as presenting. It is possible that a donor could show up and 
then not register for some reason (e.g., if there is a crowded waiting area). The ARC believes that donors who leave without 
signing in are rare since there is virtually never any delay to sign in. If donors showing up but not registering cause a bias in our 
estimates, it may be in the direction of underestimating the effect of incentives on donors presenting since incentives might have 
caused the longer lines or crowds. 
9 We use flexible functional forms for weather conditions in order to account for non-linear effects. For example, both very low 
and very high temperatures may have a negative impact on the turnout. 11 
 
specific attributes for a drive. Weather conditions represent temporary shocks to donations that should, 
however, be orthogonal to incentives. Including month fixed effects is important because the ARC 
operations have a seasonal dimension, with the district managers and drive representatives trying to 
attract donors, for example, around the December holidays or in the summer months when donations are 
typically lower than other times of the year. We also control for ARC representative fixed effects since 
they may have different abilities and social networks that affect turnout. Representatives have monthly 
and occasionally yearly targets that might cause them to reallocate their limited budgets for offering 
incentives toward the end of the month or year to meet their goals. Dummy variables for months and 
weeks of the month control for these types of variation (and we do not find incentives have any 
differential effect for any week within a month). Finally, we include zip-code fixed effects to capture 
heterogeneity correlated with socio-economic characteristics of the neighborhoods where drives take 
place. Incentives, and especially those with higher economic value, might have a greater impact in lower 
socio-economic areas. We also control for any other attribute, e.g., if the drive is given in memory or in 
honor of someone, if it is a drive specifically addressed to 0-type donors, etc., in order to control variation 
due to these attributes. 
Crucially for our identification strategy, the parameter ηi represents drive-sponsor fixed effects. We 
include drive-sponsor fixed effects because, as discussed above, heterogeneity across sponsors could 
explain some of the differences in outcomes across drives. Sponsors may have different abilities and 
social networks that can affect donor turnout. Sponsor fixed effects will control for this type of 
heterogeneity. Within drive and sponsors, however, the presence of incentives is not systematically 
linked to other characteristics, since it is mostly dictated by fairness and budget considerations. Once the 
confounding factors described above are controlled for, therefore, an analysis of the effect of incentives 
on blood donation outcomes performed within sponsor-drives through fixed-effect regressions will lead 
to well-identified, causal estimates. To the extent that different sponsor characteristics (e.g., motivation 
and abilities) are connected with drives offering incentives, controlling for sponsor fixed effects is vital to 
separate incentive effects from sponsor effects. However, to the extent that sponsor characteristics are 
independent of the presence and types of incentives offered, including sponsor fixed effects unnecessarily 
reduces the power to estimate the effect of incentives, although as reported in Table 3b there remains 
nonetheless nearly 11,000 drives with the same sponsors having variation in whether the drives they run 
offer incentives that we can use within sponsor to identify incentive effects by controlling for sponsor 
fixed effects. Controlling for sponsor fixed effects thus errs on the side of caution and is justified since 
we do not observe many potentially important differences across sponsors. We also estimate and report 
robust standard errors clustered at the sponsor level.
10  
As mentioned above, one additional concern is that sponsors might change their behavior when 
                                                            
10 For the small percentage of sponsors who ran both open and closed drives, we include a unique fixed effect for the open and 
the closed drives. This again reduces power to estimate the effect of incentives in order to err on the side of caution. 12 
 
incentives are offered compared to when they are not. For instance, they might contact more people when 
incentives are present, run an open drive rather than a closed one, or have the drive last longer. However, 
this alternative explanation for the effect of incentives seems very unlikely for several reasons. First, as 
mentioned above, interviews with ARC managers and multiple ARC representatives revealed that 
sponsors follow nearly identical procedures regardless of the presence of incentives. Second, on every 
observable that we could test in which sponsors have some discretion (specifically drive length and 
whether a drive was open or closed), we detected no significant differences within sponsor behavior 
depending on whether incentives were or were not offered.
11 Thus, we cannot find any evidence in the 
data that sponsors are changing their behavior when incentives are offered.  
In a further attempt to isolate the impact of incentives and determine the mechanisms behind any 
effect they have on any of the outcomes, we examine the impact of incentives not only over all drives but 
also separately for closed drives, open drives, and open drives in flyer counties. If incentives attract more 
donors, this effect should be greater at open drives where more donors are able to donate, and greater 
when promoted in flyer than postcard counties where more donors would be made aware that an 
incentive is being offered.  
A final question we examine is whether donors are attracted by incentives for their symbolic rather 
than, or in addition to, their economic value (e.g., T-shirts with the ARC logo – see Figure 1). To address 
this question, we estimate whether incentives of higher monetary value attract more donors. If the 
symbolic value is the only reason that the items increase turnout and units collected, and the economic 
and social value of an item are not strongly correlated, then the economic value of the incentives should 
have minimal impact on turnout and units collected. On the other hand, if there is no symbolic value, then 
the main effect of offering an incentive should have no effect on turnout or units collected after 
controlling for the items’ costs. To examine this question, we will present regressions that include the 
economic value of incentives using the ARC cost of the items as a proxy for the economic value.  
 
3.2 Findings 
Table 5a presents regressions on the number of donors presenting. The OLS estimates shown in Column 
1 without covariates compare simple mean differences between drives without incentives and drives with 
incentives. These comparisons indicate a statistically significant increase in 5.0 donors presenting when 
incentives are offered than when incentives are not offered. Compared to the mean number of 37 donors 
presenting across all drives, this estimated coefficient is substantial in magnitude. Including the controls 
described above does not substantively change the estimated effect of incentives (Column 2), nor does 
the inclusion of drive-sponsor fixed effects (Column 3).
12 
                                                            
11 These analyses are available upon request. 
12 The coefficients on the control variables are not reported here but are available upon request. Their signs are as expected. The 
length of a drive is associated with more donors presenting; rain, rain intensity, and snow all discourage donations (although 13 
 
[Table 5a about here] 
Estimates presented in Columns 4-9 examine the effect of incentives at closed and open drives and 
open drives in flyer counties, and confirm expectations that incentives have a greater impact when 
anyone can present (in open rather than closed drives) and when more potential donors are made aware of 
the incentives (in flyer than postcard counties). Columns 4-6 add interactive terms between the presence 
of incentives and whether a drive is open and/or in a flyer county.
13 These regressions show that the 
effect of incentives on turnout at open drives is significantly greater than at closed drives (by an 
additional 3.2 donors presenting – Column 4), that significantly more donors present when incentives are 
offered in flyer than postcard counties (by an extra 1.8 donors presenting – Column 5), and that the effect 
of incentives is significantly greater on donors presenting in open drives in flyer counties than at either 
closed drives or in postcard counties (by an additional 3.5 donors – Column 6). Columns 7-9 present 
estimates where the sample is split according to whether drives are closed, open, or open in flyer 
counties, and shows similar results to the previous columns. 
Table 5b presents regressions examining the effects of incentives on units of blood collected 
(Columns 1-4) and on the percent of donors deferred (Columns 5-8) using the final four models presented 
in Table 5a. The effect of incentives on units of blood collected is nearly identical to the effect on donors 
presenting. Column 4 shows that the effect of incentives at open drives in flyer counties is substantial; on 
average, compared to the mean number of 31.3 units collected across all drives, offering incentives 
increases donors presenting by 18.5 percent (5.8/31.3). Again, the effect is significantly stronger when 
the incentives are offered at drives that are open in flyer counties than when the drives are either closed or 
in postcard counties. 
[Table 5b about here] 
Columns 5-8 of Table 5b show that offering incentives does not increase the percent of donors who 
are deferred. For instance, in open drives in flyer counties (Column 8) the percent of individuals 
presenting that are deferred is actually approximately 0.3 percent lower at drives that offered incentives, 
though this difference is not statistically significant. Thus, these results indicate that offering incentives 
does not disproportionately attract individuals who are not in condition (i.e., ineligible) to donate blood. 
So far, the results indicate a strong positive effect of incentives on turnout and units of blood 
collected with no disproportionate negative effect on the fraction of donors deferred. There are, however, 
potentially two distinct sources of utility people may get when obtaining the items. First, people may be 
attracted by the material (internal consumption) value of the item. Second, donors may be attracted by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
these effects are not always statistically significant); and moderate temperatures are associated with more donations relative to 
either very cold or very warm weather. 
13 The variable indicating whether a drive is open cannot be estimated (i.e., drops out of the regression) since the sponsor-drive 
fixed effects are always nested within either open or closed drives. Likewise, the variable indicating whether a drive is in a flyer 
or a postcard county also cannot be estimated since the sponsor-drive fixed effects are always nested within either a flyer or 
postcard county. 14 
 
symbolic and social content from receiving the items. For instance, donors might be attracted by a T-shirt 
or a jacket with the ARC logo because wearing them lets donors signal their pro-social behavior and 
obtain status as a donor to friends, peers, colleagues, and total strangers. As a first attempt to disentangle 
the symbolic and social content value from the items’ material value, Table 6 reports the results from the 
fully specified regressions of Tables 5a and 5b while adding the cost of each promotion item and its 
square.  
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that incentives of higher value have a substantial and strongly 
significant impact on turnout and units collected. Moreover, once the cost of the items is controlled for, 
the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating the presence of incentives becomes small in magnitude 
and statistically insignificant. This strongly suggests that it is mostly the economic value of incentives 
that explains their effect rather than their symbolic value. Figure 2 shows the estimated effect of the cost 
of the items on turnout, units collected, and percent of donors deferred using the estimates in Table 6 for 
open drives in flyer counties; the estimated effect is essentially linear in the range of values observed in 
the sample (there is a slight concavity, and although statistically significant, it is quantitatively negligible) 
for both presenting donors and collected units. Finally, Columns 3 and 6 in Table 6 show, again, no 
significant relationship between the value of incentives and the percentage of deferred donors. 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Table 7 presents results from a similar analysis where, instead of the cost of each item being 
included as a single continuous variable, a dummy variable for each item that is offered in at least 40 
drives is included in the regressions. The results in Tables 6 and 7 are similar. Items of higher 
monetary value generally appear to attract a larger number of donors; for instance, T-shirts that cost 
$2.95 attract 6.5 extra donors, sweatshirts that cost $6.67 attract 13.3 additional donors, and jackets 
that cost $9.50 attract 25.1 extra donors. One exception is the 6-pack coolers which are the second-
most-expensive item at $9.37 yet have one of the smaller, albeit significant, effects on turnout, only 
attracting 4.3 additional donors. Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that symbolic value is 
unlikely to be the reason that offering incentives increases turnout and units collected, and pure 
economic value considerations are most likely driving the behavioral changes. The next section 
strengthens all these findings by reporting the results from a small-scale field experiment we 
conducted in which we offered gift cards with no ARC logo and thus no symbolic value. 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
4. Evidence from a Small-scale Field Experiment 
We corroborate all the main findings we obtained from the large-sample, retrospective study with 
a small-scale field experiment that we ran in collaboration with the ARC in northern Ohio. The 
experiment was meant to offer further insights on some of the patterns found in the historical data. 15 
 
First, as we mentioned above, it may be argued that the positive effect of promotions may not be due 
to their material value, but to their symbolic and social content. Therefore, it is useful to look at the 
effect of incentives that are clearly devoid of any symbolic attribute. Second, while in our analysis we 
control for ARC-representative and drive-sponsor fixed effects, we cannot completely rule out that a 
given representative or sponsor changes recruitment efforts and strategies when there is a promotion. 
To fulfill these goals through the field experiment, we selected two non-neighboring counties in 
northern Ohio. Within each county, we randomly selected four drives planned for the month of March 
2009 where no promotion was present. Two of the four drives in each county were then randomly 
selected to be controls. For the other two drives in each county, a gift card of $5 at selected local stores 
was offered in one, and a gift card of $20 was offered in the other. We chose gift cards because they 
are the rewards closest to cash (there are strict guidelines on what the FDA deems as acceptable gifts 
for blood donors, and cash is never an acceptable gift to give a volunteer blood donor) and do not have 
any symbolic or social recognition value (there is no indication of the Red Cross on the cards). The 
different amounts were meant to estimate the impact of both small and large rewards, while still being 
within the range of (retail) values of the items offered for promotion by the ARC (the items with the 
highest cost to the ARC are around $11, but we assume a higher value to the donors based on higher 
retail prices – with gift cards, there is no difference between the cost we paid and the retail price for 
consumers). In collaboration with the ARC in northern Ohio, we also ensured that the recruitment 
procedures were kept uniform for the drives with and without incentives, and that the donors were 
completely unaware that a study was being conducted. In addition to providing us with data on the 
outcomes of the eight drives that were used in our field experiment, the ARC provided us with 
information on the number of potential donors who were contacted and informed about the drives. 
These numbers do not differ significantly across the different drives of the study. 
Figure 3 shows the striking impact of incentives at the treatment drives. The increase in turnout and 
units collected at the drives where donors received a $5 gift card with respect to the averages in the 
previous three drives at the same locations was 6.5 and 3.7, respectively, whereas in the control locations 
there was no change in turnout and only 0.8 extra units collected. The size of increase in turnout and units 
collected at the $5 treatment drives are comparable to our estimated coefficients in the above analysis, on 
average and for items of roughly the same monetary value. For instance, T-shirts increased turnout by 6.5 
and 5.7 units, respectively. In the $20 treatments, turnout and units collected increased on average more 
than triple compared to the historical average at those same drives. Turnout increased by 47 donors, and 
blood collected rose by 41 units. No discernible differences were found in the control drives before and 
after the interventions. Difference-in-difference estimates for the $20 treatment, despite the small number 
of observations, are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for both turnout and units of blood 
collected. Once again, there was no disproportionate increase in deferrals. 
[Figure 3 about here] 16 
 
The results from the field experiment confirm our findings and interpretation from the historical data 
analysis. Donors respond positively to incentives, and this response seems to be driven primarily by the 
monetary value of the items rather than by their symbolic value. Also, the effects appear to be genuine 
behavioral responses of donors and not due to sponsors changing their behavior (e.g., contacting a larger 
number of potential donors) when incentives are given. 
 
5. Assessing the Presence of Substitution Effects 
A robust finding in our analyses so far is the larger effect of incentives when drives are open than closed 
and when drives are in flyer than postcard counties. This is a first indication of the possible presence of 
substitution effects; the interaction parameters in Columns 4-6 of Table 5a and Column 1 of Table 5b 
estimate the additional donors who are attracted to donate at drives they would not otherwise be aware of 
(in the case of flyer rather than county information) or would not otherwise be aware of nor able to 
donate at (in the case of open rather than closed drives). If donors are flexible regarding when and where 
they donate, then they may be influenced by incentives to change the date and location of their donations, 
in which case the above analysis could overestimate the overall effect of incentives; at least some of the 
increase may be explained by donors substituting away from one drive toward another drive offering an 
incentive. To the extent donors are substituting across drives there is no increase in overall donations. 
As a first exploration of possible substitution patterns in blood donation due to incentives being 
offered, Table 8 presents regressions examining whether incentives in past drives had an effect on 
donations in subsequent drives at the same location. The models estimated in Table 8 replicate the full 
models estimated in Columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 and add dummy variables for (a) whether a drive was 
run at the identical location within the last 56 days, (b) whether incentives were offered at that past drive, 
and (c) the cost (and its square) of the incentive offered at that past drive. The estimates indicate that the 
presence of a drive at the same location in the previous 56 days reduced turnout and units of blood 
collected at the current drive. This result is not surprising since anyone who donated at the past drive 
would be ineligible to donate at the current drive since it occurred less than 56 days prior to the current 
drive.
14 However, although the estimated incremental effect of offering an incentive at the previous drive, 
in most cases, directionally decreases turnout and units collected, suggesting donors might be temporally 
substituting forward in time donations when incentives are offered, this particular form of substitution by 
itself does not reach conventional levels of significance. However, this is just one possible way to 
substitute donations, and, for instance, donors also could have been substituting not only temporally, but 
also across locations, and so we now turn to a broader examination of potential substitution effects. 
                                                            
14 The presence of a drive in the same location within the past 56 days seems to have a positive and significant effect on the 
percentage of donors deferred. This is most likely due to the fact that when drives are run in the same location at frequencies 
higher than once every 56 days, some donors may return at the subsequent drive at that location but will be ineligible to donate 
(FDA regulations mandate a period of at least 56 days between consecutive donations), and therefore end up being deferred. 17 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
5.1 Empirical strategy 
To analyze the impact of incentives offered at drives that neighbor a drive i at time t and location j, we 
estimate the following modification of model (1): 
 
, ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt i ijt y INCENTIVE N NI X α βμ ρ γ η ε =+ + + + ++      (2) 
 
where y, INCENTIVE, X and η are defined in equation (1) above, Nijt is the number of neighboring drives, 
and NIijt indicates the number of neighboring drives offering incentives. 
We adopt a series of strategies to isolate the effects of interest. First, if they occur, substitution effects 
should be more pronounced with drives that are closer in time and space. Thus we distinguish 
neighboring drives occurring within 2 miles from a focal drive, within the 2-4 mile range, and within the 
4-10 mile range. Our construction of the set of potential substitute drives was described in section 2.2 
above. Table 4 shows summary statistics on the number of potential substitute drives at various distances 
and on the number of potential substitute drives which offered incentives. For instance, on average 2.6 
drives within a 2-mile distance offer incentives across all drives. 
Second, as discussed previously, potential donors are informed of the upcoming drive either through 
a flyer or a postcard. More precisely, in flyer counties donors are informed in advance of all the open 
drives planned for that month in that county, and for each drive the flyer indicates if there is a promotion 
and, if so, what kind. In postcard counties, in contrast, donors are informed only about one drive (or a 
small number of drives if they receive more than one postcard) just a few days before the drive date. 
Thus, if substitution effects occur, they should be stronger where donors are informed in advance about a 
larger number of drives and, of course, if these drives are open so they can attend.
15 Therefore, we 
perform separate analyses for closed drives, open drives, and open drives in flyer counties. Also, if 
substitution is driven not only by the presence of a neighboring drive, but also by the presence of 
incentives, then we should see a stronger decline in turnout at a given drive if there are incentives offered 
at neighbor drives. Thus we calculate the impact of having any drives in the neighborhood of a focal 
drive, and the effects of having neighboring drives with incentives, and look at all drives as well as closed 
drives, open drives, and open drives in flyer counties separately. Finally, the analysis above suggests that 
drives are more attractive to donors the more valuable the incentive offered at that drive. Thus, we 
examine whether substitution effects are stronger when potential substitute drives offer more expensive 
incentives. 
                                                            
15 Since some donors may receive more than one postcard if they have donated at more than one location previously, they may 
have information on more than one drive. Therefore, some substitution may still occur in postcard counties, but on average it 
should be weaker than in flyer counties where all donors would be informed of all upcoming drives in the county. 18 
 
For our purposes in this section, we use all observations with enough forward and backward temporal 
lags to have a complete record of all possible neighbors. To have a complete set of neighbor observations 
for every drive, we removed drives from the analysis (as dependent variables) that occurred within the 
first 56 days or the last 30 days. This truncation of the data removes almost 7.5 percent of the 
observations. Regressions not reported (available upon request) show that all our previous results remain 
qualitatively (and essentially quantitatively) unchanged when repeated on this reduced dataset. 
 
5.2 Findings  
Table 9a shows the effect of potential substitute drives on donors presenting. All the regressions are 
versions of the full models estimated in Table 6 with additions for frequencies of potential substitute 
drives. The regression in Column 1 includes among the regressors the number of potential substitute 
drives in three distance ranges: 0-2, 2-4, and 4-10 miles. The results indicate that the presence of one 
additional drive that is a potential substitute for a given drive reduces turnout, significantly, by 0.2 donors 
on average if it takes place within 0-2 miles. Additional drives taking place farther away than 2 miles do 
not have a significant impact. Column 2 examines whether the number of neighboring drives that offer 
incentives affects turnout at a drive. The estimates suggest that if one additional neighboring drive among 
the potential substitutes within 2 miles offers an incentive, the turnout will decline, significantly, by 0.25 
donors. Drives that offer incentives but that are located farther away do not have any effect on turnout. 
Column 3 estimates the effects of a change in the dollar value of the highest monetary value of incentives 
offered across potential substitute drives. We obtain negative, marginally significant coefficients for an 
increase in the highest monetary value incentives offered at potential substitute drives occurring within 0-
2 and 2-4 miles, but no effect for drives 4-10 miles away. These results reinforce the interpretation that 
donors are attracted toward drives offering incentives, and more so when the incentives offered have 
higher value, but also indicate that the spatial substitution is limited to drives that are within 2 miles of 
each other. 
Columns 4-6 repeat the analyses from columns 1-3, and include estimates of the interaction of the 
variables of interest with the dummy variable indicating whether an incentive was given at the current 
drive. We include these interactions since we anticipate that donors will be less likely to substitute away 
from a drive if the drive already offers an incentive. While we do not find any significant effect for this 
interaction when examining the total number of potential substitute drives (Column 4) or the number of 
potential substitutes offering incentives (though in this case the direction of the estimate is as 
anticipated), Column 6 shows that the negative effect on turnout at the current drive from the substitute 
drive offering the costliest incentives (-0.21 fewer donors) occurs only for drives not offering incentives 
and entirely disappears in drives which offer an incentive (the effect at these drives is +0.08=-0.21+0.29). 
This result indicates that donors are increasingly likely to substitute away from drives without incentives 
than from drives offering incentives the higher the value of the most expensive item offered at a 19 
 
substitute drive. 
The results from Table 9a, Columns 1-6, strongly indicate that only potential substitute drives located 
within 2 miles have significant effects on turnout at the current drive. Therefore, in what follows we 
restrict the analysis to substitute drives located within 2 miles. In Column 7, both the total number of 
potential substitute drives and the number of potential substitute drives offering incentives are included at 
the same time. The coefficient estimate on the total number of potential substitute drives within 0-2 miles 
decreases by just over 50% (compared to Column 4) from -0.199 to -0.095 and is not significant, while 
the coefficient estimate on the number of neighboring drives offering incentives falls only slightly 
(Compared to Column 5) from -0.296 to -0.255 and remains highly significant. Column 8 adds the 
highest monetary value of incentives offered in potential substitute drives. All three variables of interest 
appear to affect turnout in a way that is consistent with substitution effects being important. Column 8 
estimates show that an increase in the number of neighboring drives, an increase in the number of 
neighboring drives offering incentives, and an increase in the highest cost of an item offered at a 
neighboring drive will all negatively affect turnout, while offering an incentive at a drive will 
significantly decrease the number of donors substituting away from it toward other drives offering an 
incentive. 
Our estimates imply that substitution effects can be substantial since adding incentives can potentially 
affect many neighbors, and can be especially large if the incentive is the highest valued item offered in 
the neighborhood. For instance, consider a simple case in which an item that costs $2.50 is added as an 
incentive to an existing drive in a neighborhood (0-2 miles driving distance) with four other drives with 
none otherwise offering incentives. If we ignore substitution effects, the estimates in Column 1 of Table 6 
indicate that an additional 5.46 donors (0.572 + $2.5*2.22 – 2.5
2*0.106) will turn out. However, the 
estimates in Column 8 of Table 9a indicate that turnout also will decrease by 0.6045 = 0.157 + 0.179 * 
$2.50 donors at each of the neighboring drives since none of the other drives offer incentives. This 
implies that adding the incentive reduces turnout across all neighboring drives by a total of 2.42 = 4 * 
.6045 donors. Thus, 44 percent (2.42 / 5.46) of the extra donors who turn out at the drive offering the 
incentive when we ignored substitution effects will consist of donors who would have donated otherwise 
at one of the neighboring drives. Thus, in this simple scenario for every “new” donor showing up to 
donate when a $2.50 cost incentive is offered in a neighborhood with four other drives with none of them 
offering incentives, over 40 percent of the local increase is due to existing donors substituting away from 
donating at other drives. Hence, ignoring these temporal and spatial substitution effects can result in 
substantially overestimating the total effect of incentives on donations. 
 [Table 9a about here] 
Table 9b provides further evidence that donors are substituting across drives. The estimates in Table 
9b show that substitution effects are essentially non-existent in closed drives, generally occur at open 
drives, and are largest at open drives in flyer counties. For instance, the point estimates indicate that 20 
 
adding an incentive to a neighboring drive decreases turnout by an insignificant -0.037 donors at closed 
drives (Column 4), but decreases turnout by 0.148 donors at open drives (Column 7), and by 0.181 
donors at open drives in flyer counties (Column 10). It is not surprising that the substitution effects are 
more than three times larger at open drives and open drives in flyer counties since more donors are aware 
of, and able to substitute, their donations toward the open drives. Similarly, the estimates indicate that an 
increase in the value of the highest cost incentive offered at a potential substitute drive is smallest and 
insignificant at closed drives (-0.063) and is much larger and significant at open drives (-0.201) and open 
drives in flyer counties (-0.229) when the current drive does not offer an incentive. Thus, as anticipated, 
substitution effects are larger when donors are able to substitute (at open drives) and when more donors 
are aware of more options to donate (in flyer counties). These results are consistent with standard 
economic theory in general, but have generally not been documented in the context of pro-social 
behavior. 
Table 9b presents similar regressions to those in Table 9a for the units of blood collected and the 
percent of donors deferred. The patterns that emerge for units collected are very similar to those 
estimated for the number of donors presenting. For deferrals, it is possible that drives offering incentives 
could siphon donors who are more likely to be deferred because they have qualities that might be more 
attracted to drives with incentives. However, we find no systematic evidence of this type of substitution 
occurring. 
[Table 9b about here] 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
We present evidence indicating that incentives offered at blood drives significantly increase the number 
of donors presenting, the number of units of blood collected, and does not increase the proportion of 
deferrals. We have also shown, however, that donors substitute donations across time and locations to 
take advantage of the material incentives. In the case of donors presenting at a drive, the estimated effect 
of incentives on donations may indeed be unchanged if there are no or just a few neighboring drives, but 
could be severely attenuated if there are many neighboring drives. 
The most important contributions of this study to the literature on the effects of extrinsic incentives 
on pro-social behavior are twofold. First, within the current paradigm of looking at the “local” effects of 
incentives, we provide field evidence from a large and representative population, and analyze the effects 
of many incentives used in the field. In this setting – and with specific reference to blood donations – we 
found that neither crowding out of motivations nor adverse selection appear to be consequences of the 
presence of incentives. Second, we expanded beyond the existing approaches and explore the “total” 
effects of incentives, when donors can choose between different locations and times to donate. This 
extension is crucial since it shows that the positive, local effects of incentives are attenuated when we 
consider substitution effects.  21 
 
Our results also contribute to the literature on whether “repugnance” can be a barrier to the existence 
of a market for certain goods or services such as blood or human body organs (Becker and Elias 2007; 
Roth 2007). Repugnance for certain transactions goes beyond crowding out arguments and potential 
market failures to include moral concerns that raise opposition to certain market transactions being 
acceptable. The positive response to explicit incentives we document suggests that receiving rewards for 
offering blood is not considered on average repugnant among blood donors in the US today. However, 
this does not mean that no donors exist who perceive receiving incentives for blood as repugnant, nor can 
we say anything about overall social welfare affects from this study in regard to the repugnance. It is 
possible that the US donor attitudes may be evolving with the increasing presence of private blood banks 
that pay donors for their blood products, though it is difficult to assess cause and effect; if repugnance for 
compensation for blood donations is receding in the US, the presence of private blood banks could be 
part of the reason, yet the receding repugnance attitudes due to unrelated reasons could alternatively be 
opening the possibility for private blood banks to flourish. 
Our approach and results are also of interest for the organization of pro-social and charitable 
activities. On the one hand, we provided evidence that donors are not “shied away” by the presence of 
rewards. In fact, the organization we studied in this paper, the ARC Blood Service in northern Ohio, uses 
promotions in a conscious effort to increase donations. On the other hand, we show that the geographical 
and temporal organization of charitable activities influences the overall outcomes of these activities.  
There are some important limitations to the current study. While it is reasonable to argue that there 
are few close substitutes for donating blood at one location and at one time other than donating at another 
location and time, it is also possible that there are other substitutes. For instance, it is also possible that 
donors may substitute away from donating plasma to instead donate blood, which suggests our analysis 
including only American Red Cross blood donations as a possible substitute may still overestimate the 
overall effect of material incentives on blood donations on the more general category of blood product 
donations. While plasma donations have some differences from whole blood donations (e.g., it takes 
longer and has more health restrictions), in one respect it may be a close substitute since many plasma 
donors are paid for their plasma donations. Broadening the category of possible substitutes even further, 
additional pro-social activities that may be a substitute for blood donations could be any number of other 
physical activities that require some effort and possibly some minor discomfort. It is also possible that 
some donors substitute away from monetary donations to the American Red Cross when material 
incentives are offered, but we cannot observe this behavior. Thus, we conjecture that the current analysis 
presents a potential lower bound on the size of the substitution effect, but we do not expect that the 
estimates are too far off the total substitution effects since we are able to estimate the effects of the 
closest substitutes, and also since we find that going beyond four miles and more than 56 days we cannot 
detect any substitution effects. 
The analysis may further overestimate the effect of incentives if sponsor behavior depends on 22 
 
whether promotions are offered. For instance, when incentives are offered sponsors may view the drive as 
more important, or believe that donors will be more satisfied with the experience as a consequence of the 
material incentives. For these reasons, and possibly several others, sponsors could attempt to contact 
additional donors (some of whom may donate elsewhere), including friends, family, and colleagues. The 
results of our small-scale field experiment, however, which revealed strong effects of incentives even 
when the sponsors and representatives behavior was unchanged, makes us confident that what we 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
Mean St.Dev. Min. Median Max.
Number of donors presenting 37.0 26.9 0 31 797
Units of blood collected 31.3 23.0 0 26 688
Donors deferred (% of presenting) 15.4 9.0 0 14.3 100
Open drives 0.78 0.42 0 1 1
Drives in "flyer" counties 0.80 0.40 0 1 1
Open drives in "flyer" counties 0.61 0.49 0 1 1
Drive length (hours) 5.4 1.2 1 5 18
Incentives given (yes = 1) 0.37 0.48 0 0 1
Temperature (F) 55.2 18.0 0 59 89
Fraction <32F 0.14
Rain 0.13 0.32 0 0 6.89
Rain intensity 0.03 0.08 0 0 3.33
Fraction days with rain 0.46
Snow 0.23 0.96 0 0 15.4
Fraction days with snow 0.09
 
Notes: Rain measures inches of rain on the day of the drive; Rain intensity is measured as rain divided by hours 
of precipitation on the day of the drive; Snow measures the amount of snow (inches) in the 48 hours preceding 
a drive, and it is meant to capture the amount of snow on the ground on the day of the drive. “Flyer” counties 
are counties where donors receive, every month, a flyer with information on all (open) drives that will take 
place in their county in that month. Donors in “non-flyer” or “postcard” counties, in contrast, receive a 




















Table 2: Incentives 
 
 
At drives where incentives 
were offered At open drives
At open drives in "flyer" 
counties
%%%
t-shirt 49.00 47.15 46.49
coupon 8.38 9.14 9.73
cedar point ticket (raffle) 5.02 4.29 3.85
cooler 3.00 3.20 3.17
sweatshirt 2.43 2.85 2.97
umbrella 2.37 2.54 2.20
hat 1.71 1.93 1.94
6-pack cooler 1.52 1.81 1.94
blanket 1.15 1.30 1.41
scarf 1.15 1.30 1.29
mug 0.95 0.99 0.50
music download card 0.93 1.04 1.00
jacket 0.86 1.01 1.03
other 3.21 3.25 3.17
sponsor promo 25.03 25.57 26.77
# Drives 5,141 4,244 3,403
 
 
Notes: The percentages do not sum up to 100 because more than one item might be offered at a single drive. 
The “other” category includes incentives that were offered in fewer than 40 drives. The “sponsor promos” 



























Table 3a: Sponsor types and incentives 
 
 
Type of Drive Sponsor Frequency
Percent of 
all drives




General Community 6,164 43.9% 36.9 0.42
Manufacturing 1,517 10.8% 30.5 0.22
Hospital 1,242 8.9% 35.7 0.40
High School 991 7.1% 65.8 0.54
Professional Services 618 4.4% 27.5 0.22
Catholic 429 3.1% 37.0 0.23
College 401 2.9% 41.4 0.34
Banking 241 1.7% 32.7 0.31
Elementary School 232 1.7% 35.7 0.03
Red Cross Chapter 224 1.6% 32.0 0.55
Clinic 156 1.1% 29.0 0.50
Federal 146 1.0% 37.4 0.31
Lutheran 140 1.0% 30.9 0.24
Nursing Homes 140 1.0% 18.1 0.34
County 125 0.9% 24.6 0.29
Utilities 115 0.8% 31.5 0.26
Retail 114 0.8% 25.6 0.31
State 107 0.8% 24.2 0.23
Other 927 6.6% 35.9 0.34





Table 3b: Individual sponsors and incentives 
 
 
Number of Percent of Number Percent of Mean # of
sponsors all sponsors of drives all drives donors presenting
1. Sponsors who ran exactly one drive 846 31.8 846 6.0 27.3
   AND offered incentives 527 19.8 527 3.8 31.1
2. Sponsors who ran at least two drives 1,818 68.2 13,183 94.0 37.6
  AND never offered incentives 416 15.6 1,534 10.9 28.2
  AND always offered incentives 218 8.2 771 5.5 42.2
  AND sometimes offered incentives 1184 44.4 10878 77.5 38.6







Table 4: Statistics on potential substitute drives 
 
For all drives
0-2 miles 2-4 miles 4-10 miles
mean 6.5 7.7 36.6
sd 8.0 9.0 34.7
min 0 0 0
max 50 72 190
Potential subst. drives with incentives taking place within:
0-2 miles 2-4 miles 4-10 miles
mean 2.6 3.1 14.6
sd 3.8 4.5 15.8
min 0 0 0
max 35 42 108
For drives with incentives
0-2 miles 2-4 miles 4-10 miles
mean 6.8 7.9 36.9
sd 7.8 9.1 34.3
min 0 0 0
max 50 71 190
Potential subst. drives without incentives taking place within:
0-2 miles 2-4 miles 4-10 miles
mean 3.6 4.4 21.0
sd 4.6 5.8 20.2
min 0 0 0
max 31 49 120
Potential substitute drives taking place within:
Potential substitute drives taking place within:
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a location/date. N = 12,425: Drives in the bottom and top 1 percent of the 
distribution of donors presenting were dropped from the sample; we also deleted from the sample used for the 
regressions (but not for the computation of the number of substitute drives) the drives that took place in the 
first 56 days and in the last 30 days of the sample period (5/1/2006-10/8/2008). The number of possible 
substitute drives was computed as follows. For a given drive X, potential substitute drives are open drives 
that occurred in the same County as drive X, between 56 days prior to drive X and (1) the end of the month in 
which drive X occurred, when drive X occurred on the 24th of the month or earlier, (2) the end of the 
following month, when drive X occurred on the 25th of the month or later. Further explanations are provided 
in the text. Distance was measured in travel miles between street addresses, computed using standard GIS 
network-path algorithms for finding the shortest path through a network. All calculations were performed in 




Table 5: Direct effects of incentives regressions 
 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Incentive dummy 5.028*** 5.238*** 5.385*** 3.123*** 3.972*** 3.213*** 2.142*** 6.108*** 6.674***
(0.372) (0.315) (0.319) (0.500) (0.563) (0.404) (0.504) (0.370) (0.440)
Incentive*Open Drive 3.209***
(0.630)
Incentive*Drive in "Flyer" County 1.772***
(0.667)
Incentive*Open Drive in "Flyer" County 3.467***
(0.598)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sponsor fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,707 13,529 13,529 13,529 13,529 13,529 2,999 10,530 8,340
R-squared 0.01 0.52 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22
Number of sponsors 2,664 2,664 2,582 2,582 2,582 2,582 792 1,790 1,469
Mean of the dependent variable 37.0
All drives
OLS Sponsor Fixed Effects




5b: Units of blood collected and donors deferred regressions 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incentive dummy 2.828*** 1.788*** 5.352*** 5.823*** -0.018 0.302 -0.263 -0.284
(0.366) (0.443) (0.325) (0.385) (0.278) (0.356) (0.189) (0.211)
Incentive*Open Drive in "Flyer" County 2.980*** -0.213
(0.530) (0.348)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sponsor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,529 2,999 10,530 8,340 13,529 2,999 10,530 8,340
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Number of sponsors 2,582 792 1,790 1,469 2,582 792 1,790 1,469
Mean of the dependent variable 31.3 15.4%
Units of blood collected Donors deferred (% of presenting)
 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5a present results of OLS regressions. The remaining columns of Table 5a 
and all the columns in Table 5b present results of fixed effects regressions, where the fixed effects are defined 
at the level of the individual sponsor. Controls include: year effects, month effects, week-of-the-month and 
day-of-the-week effects; dummy variables for other attributes of the drive; the length of the drive (in hours); 
weather conditions on the day of the drive (amount of rain in inches and its square, rain intensity [measures as 
rain per hour of precipitation] and its square, amount of snow fallen in the 48 hours before a drive and its 
square, and temperature dummy variables [0-36, 36-53, 53-68, 68-75, 75+]); dummy variables for each ARC 
representative as well as for zip codes are also included. Standard errors clustered at the sponsor level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 29 
 








Units collected % Donors 
deferred
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incentive dummy 0.572 0.423 0.363 1.435 0.972 0.151
(1.080) (0.950) (0.630) (1.300) (1.150) (0.720)
Cost of incentive ($) 2.220*** 1.986*** -0.259 2.436*** 2.272*** -0.238
(0.490) (0.430) (0.270) (0.580) (0.520) (0.310)
Cost of incentive squared -0.106** -0.0947** 0.00875 -0.107** -0.104** 0.0114
(0.047) (0.041) (0.026) (0.054) (0.048) (0.030)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sponsor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,529 13,529 13,529 8,340 8,340 8,340
Number of sponsor fixed effects 2,582 2,582 2,582 1,469 1,469 1,469
R-squared 0.21 0.19 0.04 0.24 0.22 0.04




Notes: The cost to the ARC of each specific promo is shown in Table 7. All results are from fixed effects 
regressions, where the fixed effects are defined at the level of the individual sponsor. Controls include: year 
effects, month effects, week-of-the-month and day-of-the-week effects; dummy variables for other attributes of 
the drive; the length of the drive (in hours); weather conditions on the day of the drive (amount of rain in 
inches and its square, rain intensity [measured as rain per hour of precipitation] and its square, amount of snow 
fallen in the 48 hours before a drive and its square, and temperature dummy variables [0-36, 36-53, 53-68, 68-
75, 75+]); dummy variables for each ARC representative as well as for zip codes are also included. We have 
also included a dummy variable for the items for which information on cost was not available. Standard errors 














































t-shirt 2,519 $2.95 6.460*** 5.712*** -0.455** 7.822*** 6.968*** -0.707***
(0.374) (0.327) (0.204) (0.474) (0.410) (0.251)
coupon 431 $3.64 6.018*** 5.211*** 0.09 7.695*** 6.578*** 0.369
(0.683) (0.618) (0.430) (0.833) (0.760) (0.536)
cedar point ticket (raffle) 258 NA 2.179** 1.687* 0.272 3.778* 2.793 0.683
(1.038) (0.898) (0.732) (2.086) (1.780) (1.151)
cooler 154 $1.78 2.569*** 2.179*** 0.207 3.962*** 3.347*** 0.179
(0.945) (0.801) (0.901) (1.295) (1.080) (1.126)
sweatshirt 125 $6.67 13.331*** 12.076*** -2.082** 16.246*** 14.33*** -1.133
(1.283) (1.171) (0.879) (1.395) (1.300) (1.001)
umbrella 122 $4.58 5.496*** 4.584*** 0.175 7.435*** 6.268*** -0.102
(0.997) (0.873) (0.728) (1.326) (1.140) (0.972)
hat 88 $1.94 3.757*** 3.599*** -1.554 4.394*** 3.959*** -0.877
(1.206) (1.012) (0.960) (1.543) (1.260) (1.154)
6-pack cooler 78 $9.37 4.339*** 3.604*** 0.311 7.404*** 6.364*** -0.101
(1.504) (1.336) (0.994) (1.672) (1.490) (1.092)
blanket 59 $6.33 14.359*** 13.002*** -1.763 16.718*** 14.90*** -0.972
(1.772) (1.681) (1.169) (1.980) (1.900) (1.250)
scarf 59 $2.50 9.151*** 7.007*** 2.193 10.834*** 8.474*** 2.194*
(1.674) (1.532) (1.384) (1.947) (1.790) (1.273)
mug 49 1.42 9.228*** 7.844*** 0.605 10.679*** 8.684*** -0.751
(1.607) (1.359) (0.987) (2.711) (1.980) (1.728)
music download card 48 NA 5.140** 4.263** 0.428 7.755** 6.296** -1.01
(2.434) (2.129) (1.798) (3.095) (2.660) (1.854)
jacket 44 $9.50 25.073*** 21.942*** -2.111* 27.256*** 23.61*** -1.278
(2.293) (2.005) (1.280) (2.846) (2.520) (1.475)
other material 165 N.A. 4.602*** 3.359*** 1.341* 5.149*** 3.684*** 1.732**
(1.177) (1.009) (0.689) (1.482) (1.240) (0.857)
sponsor promo 1,287 N.A. 2.100*** 1.764*** 0.216 2.229*** 1.953*** -0.048
(0.551) (0.468) (0.354) (0.689) (0.580) (0.431)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sponsor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,529 13,529 13,529 8,340 8,340 8,340
Number of sponsors 2,582 2,582 2,582 1,469 1,469 1,469
R-squared 0.22 0.20 0.04 0.26 0.24 0.04
All Drives Open Drives in "flyer" Counties
 
 
Notes: All results are from fixed effects regressions, where the fixed effects are defined at the level of the 
individual sponsor. Controls include: year effects, month effects, week-of-the-month and day-of-the-week 
effects; dummy variables for other attributes of the drive; the length of the drive (in hours); weather conditions 
on the day of the drive (amount of rain in inches and its square, rain intensity [measured as rain per hour of 
precipitation] and its square, amount of snow fallen in the 48 hours before a drive and its square, and 
temperature dummy variables [0-36, 36-53, 53-68, 68-75, 75+]); dummy variables for each ARC representative 
as well as for zip codes are also included. Standard errors clustered at the sponsor level are reported in 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incentive at current drive 0.526 0.526 0.542 1.252 0.374 0.831 0.663 0.152
(1.200) (1.200) (1.200) (1.410) (1.050) (1.250) (0.670) (0.740)
Cost of incentive ($) 2.377*** 2.377*** 2.371*** 2.623*** 2.104*** 2.414*** -0.327 -0.189
(0.550) (0.550) (0.550) (0.650) (0.480) (0.570) (0.290) (0.320)
Cost of incentive squared -0.123** -0.123** -0.121** -0.122** -0.107** -0.117** 0.016 0.012
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.060) (0.046) (0.053) (0.028) (0.031)
Previous drive (within 56 days of current) -1.294*** -1.294*** -1.306*** -1.530*** -1.384*** -1.611*** 0.658*** 0.730***
(0.330) (0.330) (0.330) (0.400) (0.300) (0.360) (0.220) (0.270)
Incentive at previous drive -0.003 -0.380 -0.419 -0.303 -0.283 -0.107 -0.309
(0.260) (0.450) (0.580) (0.370) (0.480) (0.300) (0.360)
Cost of incentive at previous drive ($) 0.148 -0.003 0.165 0.004 -0.037 -0.013
(0.230) (0.290) (0.200) (0.240) (0.160) (0.200)
Cost of incentive at previous drive squared 0.000 0.018 -0.007 0.010 0.013 0.017
(0.029) (0.035) (0.024) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sponsor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,996 10,996 10,996 6,894 10,996 6,894 10,996 6,894
Number of sponsor fixed effects 1,788 1,788 1,788 1,021 1,788 1,021 1,788 1,021
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.23 0.04 0.05




Notes: All results are from fixed effects regressions, where the fixed effects are defined at the level of the 
individual sponsor. Controls include: year effects, month effects, week-of-the-month and day-of-the-week 
effects; dummy variables for other attributes of the drive; the length of the drive (in hours); weather conditions 
on the day of the drive (amount of rain in inches and its square, rain intensity [measured as rain per hour of 
precipitation] and its square, amount of snow fallen in the 48 hours before a drive and its square, and 
temperature dummy variables [0-36, 36-53, 53-68, 68-75, 75+]); dummy variables for each ARC representative 
as well as for zip codes are also included. We have also included a dummy variable for the items for which 
information on cost was not available. Standard errors clustered at the sponsor level are reported in 
















Table 9a: Substitution effects on number of donors presenting  
 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Incentive dummy 0.527 0.750 0.537 1.235 0.858 0.054 0.750 0.285
-1.134 -1.139 -1.140 -1.165 -1.155 -1.176 -1.145 -1.146
Cost of incentive ($) 2.287*** 2.226*** 2.292*** 2.247*** 2.223*** 2.235*** 2.229*** 2.156***
(0.520) (0.521) (0.522) (0.520) (0.521) (0.521) (0.519) (0.519)
Cost of incentive squared -0.112** -0.105** -0.111** -0.107** -0.105** -0.106** -0.106** -0.101**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
taking place within 0-2 miles -0.201 -0.199 -0.095 -0.107
(0.056)*** (0.057)*** (0.058) (0.057)*
   x Incentive dummy -0.009 -0.04 -0.051
(0.041) (0.061) (0.062)
taking place within 2-4 miles -0.049 -0.036
(0.048) (0.052)
   x Incentive dummy -0.03
(0.041)
taking place within 4-10 miles 0.015 0.02
(0.017) (0.018)
   x Incentive dummy -0.011
(0.011)
taking place within 0-2 miles -0.246*** -0.296*** -0.255*** -0.157**
(0.057) (0.070) (0.071) (0.074)
   x Incentive dummy 0.079 0.091 -0.026
(0.073) (0.108) (0.114)
taking place within 2-4 miles -0.002 -0.004
(0.045) (0.054)
   x Incentive dummy 0.005
(0.069)
taking place within 4-10 miles 0.000 0.011
(0.016) (0.017)
   x Incentive dummy -0.023
(0.022)
Highest cost ($) of incentive offered at potential 
substitute drives, at drives:
taking place within 0-2 miles -0.093* -0.207*** -0.179***
(0.051) (0.059) (0.060)
   x Incentive dummy 0.285*** 0.345***
(0.087) (0.093)
taking place within 2-4 miles -0.093* -0.084
(0.050) (0.053)
   x Incentive dummy -0.027
(0.092)
taking place within 4-10 miles -0.025 -0.015
(0.043) (0.048)
   x Incentive dummy -0.027
(0.078)
Sponsor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,254 12,254 12,254 12,254 12,254 12,254 12,254 12,254
Number of sponsors 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Dependent variable: number of donors presenting at a drive; All drives
Number of Potential Substitute Drives With Incentives
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Incentive dummy 0.285 0.096 0.489 -3.17 -1.682 -1.748 1.157 0.798 0.651 0.681 0.338 -0.067
(1.146) (0.998) (0.672) (3.960) (3.005) (2.187) (1.191) (1.045) (0.719) (1.361) (1.197) (0.796)
Cost of incentive ($) 2.156*** 1.909*** -0.206 2.237 1.369 1.034 2.156*** 1.954*** -0.316 2.316*** 2.13*** -0.091
(0.519) (0.453) (0.283) (1.815) (1.363) (1.013) (0.537) (0.472) (0.300) (0.606) (0.535) (0.319)
Cost of incentive squared -0.101** -0.087** 0.003 -0.195 -0.113 -0.123 -0.095* -0.086* 0.011 -0.093* -0.089* -0.002
(0.049) (0.043) (0.027) (0.180) (0.132) (0.114) (0.050) (0.044) (0.028) (0.056) (0.050) (0.030)
taking place within 0-2 miles -0.107* -0.095* 0.011 0.128 0.102 -0.021 -0.156** -0.136** 0.022 -0.260** -0.223** -0.043
(0.057) (0.051) (0.047) (0.111) (0.096) (0.112) (0.066) (0.060) (0.051) (0.110) (0.094) (0.054)
   x Incentive dummy -0.051 -0.021 -0.019 -0.023 0.012 -0.049 -0.051 -0.026 -0.007 0.119 0.111 0.044
(0.062) (0.052) (0.055) (0.084) (0.065) (0.101) (0.073) (0.061) (0.061) (0.121) (0.099) (0.090)
taking place within 0-2 miles -0.157** -0.101 -0.085 -0.037 -0.028 0.029 -0.148* -0.087 -0.114* -0.181* -0.101 -0.168**
(0.074) (0.062) (0.057) (0.150) (0.126) (0.159) (0.082) (0.069) (0.060) (0.109) (0.097) (0.075)
   x Incentive dummy -0.026 -0.069 0.047 -0.255 -0.318** 0.186 -0.023 -0.056 0.017 -0.101 -0.145 0.076
(0.114) (0.096) (0.107) (0.179) (0.150) (0.197) (0.128) (0.109) (0.118) (0.164) (0.140) (0.159)
taking place within 0-2 miles -0.179*** -0.199*** 0.127** -0.063 -0.117 0.138 -0.201*** -0.215*** 0.126** -0.229*** -0.248*** 0.182***
(0.060) (0.051) (0.050) (0.101) (0.088) (0.122) (0.069) (0.059) (0.055) (0.081) (0.069) (0.063)
   x Incentive dummy 0.345*** 0.317*** -0.067 0.464** 0.452*** -0.092 0.302*** 0.275*** -0.059 0.263** 0.262** -0.134*
(0.093) (0.082) (0.065) (0.197) (0.168) (0.159) (0.102) (0.091) (0.070) (0.120) (0.105) (0.080)
Sponsor fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,254 12,254 12,254 2,715 2,715 2,715 9,539 9,539 9,539 7,541 7,541 7,541
Number of sponsors 2,469 2,469 2,469 765 765 765 1,704 1,704 1,704 1,393 1,393 1,393
R-squared 0.21 0.20 0.04 0.23 0.22 0.05 0.24 0.22 0.05 0.25 0.23 0.05
Number of Potential Substitute Drives 
Overall 
Number of Potential Substitute Drives 
With Incentives
Highest $ value of incentive offered at 
potential substitute drives, at drives…




Notes to Tables 9a and 9b: All results are from fixed effects regressions, where the fixed effects are defined at 
the level of the individual sponsor. The number of observations in these regressions differs from the previous 
tables because here we are excluding from the sample the drives that occurred in the first 56 days and those 
occurring in the last 30 days of the sample period. The number of potential substitute drives was computed as 
described in the notes to Table 8. All regressions include: year effects, month effects, week-of-the-month and 
day-of-the-week effects; dummy variables for other attributes of the drive; the length of the drive (in hours); 
weather conditions on the day of the drive (amount of rain in inches and its square, rain intensity [measured as 
rain per hour of precipitation] and its square, amount of snow fallen in the 48 hours before a drive and its 
square, and temperature dummy variables [0-36, 36-53, 53-68, 68-75, 75+]); dummy variables for each ARC 
representative as well as for zip codes are also included. The standard errors of the coefficients (reported in 
















Figure 1: Examples of ARC flyer and postcards 
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Donors Presenting (left axis) Units Collected (left axis) % Deferred (right axis)
Lowest cost item: 
Mugs $1.74





Notes: Predicted values obtained using the results from Table 6, columns 4-6. The baseline is open drives of 
average length (5.4 hours) taking place in flyer counties on the first Wednesday of April, on days with no rain, 

























Figure 3: Results from the field experiment 
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